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Abstract 
This paper uses a simple economic model of contract choice to 
explain the growth of sharecropping in sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century France--a topic that figures in much of the social and economic 
history of the period. The theory turns out to fit both qualitati·ve 
and quantitative evidence, and although the results are as yet only 
preliminary, the theory does provide a better account of the spread of 
sharecropping than the explanations early modern historians have 
tended to rely upon. 
ECONOMIC THEORY AND SHARECROPPING 
IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE 
Philip T. Hoffman 
Between the close of the Middle Ages and roughly 1700, the 
French countryside witnessed a dramatic expansion of sharecropping. 
Little known in most regions of France in medieval times, agricultural 
sharecropping, to quote Marc Bloch, "showed a sudden increase" in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, just as it had earlier in 
northern Italy. For Bloch and historians ever since, the spread of 
sharecropping was part of a far larger process which saw peasants fall 
into debt and then lose their land to nobles, royal officers, city 
dwellers (bourgeois), and other privileged persons. This enormous 
transfer of property--Bloch termed it "the most decisive event of 
French social history"--stripped many a peasant of his property and 
reduced him to the status of a poor "sharecropper, often working what 
had once been his own land, which had been sold to some noble or rich 
bourgeois. 111 
Because of its links with the wholesale loss of peasant land, 
most French historians associate sharecropping with rural poverty and 
increasing social stratification in the countryside. They also blame 
it for the stagnation of the French rural economy. Cut off from cash 
markets and lacking any capital, the French sharecropper (so the 
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argument goes) would simply not improve the land he worked. His 
landlord was equally unlikely to do so, either because such investments 
returned him too little or because he seemed less interested in 
commercial agriculture than in consuming the produce from his land and 
in relishing the status property ownership conferred. In addition, the 
draconian terms of most sharecropping contracts appeared to stifle any 
initiative. They dictated in great detail what a sharecropper was to 
do and thus, it is claimed, strangled individual initiative by 
tenants. 2 
Needless to say, this picture of sharecropping and of its 
consequences leaves something to be desired. That sharecropping grew 
more common in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and that its 
growth paralleled the increasing impoverishment of the French peasantry 
is undeniable. But it is not at all clear why anyone adopted 
sharecropping in the first place, nor why its spread was linked to the 
impoverishment of the peasantry. And as we shall see, both 
contemporary attitudes and the modern theory of share contracts cast 
grave doubt upon the belief that sharecropping hindered economic 
growth in the countryside. 
Let us first consider how historians have explained the 
adoption of sharecropping. For Marc Bloch, sharecropping suited 
poorer tenants, who lacked capital. It was also "preferred by 
landlords of the petty bourgeois type." Such owners (so Bloch argued) 
favored sharecropping because their estates were too meagre to attract 
cash-paying tenants and because share leases provided produce for the 
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cellar and deference for the ego.3 The problem with Bloch's 
explanation, though, is that it simply does not fit the facts. 
According to the most thorough local investigation of sharecropping 
--Louis Merle's study of the Gatine poitevine--it was not the petty 
bourgeoisie but the nobility who first leased farms on shares, and 
evidence from another region, the Lyonnais, also runs counter to 
Bloch.4 There, petty bourgeois landlords showed no sign of preferring 
share contracts, and while poorer tenants might have displayed a 
slight inclination toward cropping, the difference was so small that 
it could easily have been the result of chance (Table 1),5 
The well worn factors that early modern historians usually 
invoke to make sense of agricultural change--inflation, population 
pressure, and seignorial dues--also fail to account for the spread of 
sharecropping. Sharecropping flourished both during the inflation of 
the sixteenth century and during the declining prices of the 1600s. It 
spread in times of population growth and of population decline, and 
despite overall similarities in European population trends, 
sharecropping took root only in particular areas, such as parts of 
Italy and France. 
Finally, at least in France, the rise of sharecropping did not 
coincide with any major shift in seignorial dues or seignorial 
authority: the great dislocations in seignorial power occurred either 
in the later Middle Ages, well before sharecropping prevailed, or in 
the eighteenth century, well after it was firmly established.6 
Fortunately, a much more successful explanation of 
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TABLE 1 
LOGIT ANALYSIS OF SHARE AND NON-SHARE CONTRACTS 
VARIABLE 
Constant 
PB (1 for Petty-
Bourgeois Landlords, 
0 Otherwise) 
POOR (1 for Poorer 
Tenants, 0 Otherwise) 
N 
COEFFICIENT 
-0.786 
-0.015 
0. 753 
83 cases 
Likelihood ratio statistic: 11.51 (3 df) 
T-STATISTIC 
-1.40 
-1.68 
1.26 
Source: Sample of 83 rental, share and labor contracts from Archives 
departmentales du Rhone, 3 E 1028-30, 1058, 2208-09, 2192, 8721-23, 
8731-32, 8740, 8779. The records involved were all notarial records 
from a tiny area south of Lyon, near the towns of Saint-Genis-Lave!, 
Taluyers, and Givors. The contracts date from the period 1563-1633, 
when the growth of sharecropping was at its height. 
Note: Petty bourgeois landlords include artisans, merchants (except 
for marchands bourgeois), notaries and minor officers. Poorer 
tenants include laboureurs and those for whom no occupation was 
given. The dependent variable y is 1 for share contracts and 0 
otherwise. The logit model assumes that y depends on an unobserved 
. * variable y = a0 + a1 PB + a2 POOR + u, where the 
ai aie unknown coefficients, u has a logistic distribution, y = 1 
it y > 0, and y = 0 otherwise. We estimate the ai by maximum 
likelihood methods (they are given with t-statistics in the table), and 
we can use them much as we use regression coefficients. For example, 
a positive al would imply that petty bourgeois landlords were more 
likely to lease land on shares (as Bloch maintains), while a negative 
al would imply the reverse. The same would hold for a2• 
But since our a1 turns out to have a sign different from what Bloch 
suggested and since our a2 turns out not to be significantly different 
from zero, the evidence belies Bloch's argument. 
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sharecropping emerges from a consideration of the problems landlords 
faced. Perhaps the best contemporary discussion of these difficulties 
appears in Olivier de Serres' ThEiitre de !'agriculture, the classic 
1600 treatise on French farming. For de Serres, the hardships property 
owners encountered were legion. Chief among them was the task of 
managing and of overseeing farms, a matter to which de Serres devoted 
an entire chapter of his book. Ideally, de Serres argued, a landlord 
would work his own land, hiring laborers and personally supervising 
their efforts. The drawback, though, was that farms and agricultural 
laborers required constant attention on the part of the owner. Only 
his supervision could "make the lazy diligent" and counter "the evil 
tendency of most hired hands, which in the absence of the master leads 
them n:erely to feign any effort." But the master's presence would cost 
him dearly if his property lay far from his home or if he had other 
affairs where he "earned much more than in the cultivation of the 
soil."7 
For absentee landlords of this sort, renting was the obvious 
alternative, either for fixed rent or for shares. But even renting 
entailed certain complications. It was hard to find a reliable tenant 
who, while paying a fixed rent, would remain solvent, shoulder all the 
work, and absorb "at his own loss or profit" all the risks of the farm 
year. Such a tenant would pay less rent in return for taking on all 
the risk, and he would demand an even greater reduction if he furnished 
all the seed, livestock, and other farm inputs.8 Given the 
difficulties of finding dependable tenants, de Serres recommended 
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sharecropping for most absentee landlords. It would be easier to find 
a trustworthy share tenant, for he did not "risk everything in 
advance," and he was less likely to go bankrupt. Whatever the form of 
the lease, though, the landlord would still have to watch over the 
tenant. Even a fixed-rent tenant might neglect buildings and fences or 
ignore problems with ditches that might cause flooding or erosion long 
after his lease had run out. He might cut vines too short, which could 
boost the yield during his tenure but reduce productivity thereafter. 
And at the end of his tenure, he might return the land "tired and 
exhausted, like rental horses."9 
One might dismiss de Serres as overly progressive and therefore 
unrepresentative of the majority of French landlords, but contracts in 
notarial registers testify to the same concerns. Labor contracts (such 
as the one concluded in 1598 between the notary Estienne Moyne of 
Saint-Genis-Laval and two partners, on the one hand, and Pierre Dupyn 
and Nicolas Charpin of Saint-Genis, on the other) always specified the 
tasks the laborers were to perform. Dupyn and Charpin, for example, 
were told in great detail what they were to do in a local vineyard that 
Moyne and his partners managed, and they were paid in stages as the 
work progressed in order to keep them from shirking. Share contracts 
did much the same, since croppers also had reason to undersupply labor. 
As for rental contracts, they commonly obliged tenants to pledge other 
property as security against default. And whatever the contract, all 
farm owners tried to prohibit the misuse of property by tenants who 
might squander resources while avoiding the costs. It was not unusual 
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to see prohibitions against the neglect of ditches and buildings, 
against the overworking of vines, excessive grazing or logging, and, in 
general, against the failure to return the property in good shape at 
the end of the lease.IO 
In a frictionless, one-period world of no risks and perfect 
information, such problems never arise. But in the real world, these 
problems do bedevil landlords, and under the heading of transaction 
costs, they form part of the modern theory of agricultural contracts, a 
subject that has attracted the attention of a number of economic 
theorists and economic historians. Although this theory of contracts 
is far from complete, it does at least provide an explanation for the 
coexistence of rental, share, and wage-labor contracts in agriculture, 
and it also accounts for variations in the contractual mix.11 In a 
nutshell, the theory is based upon a trade off between the transaction 
costs associated with a given contract and the risk premium needed to 
get parties to enter that contract. The transaction costs, which fall 
upon landlords, include the costs of enforcing the contract and of 
insuring that the tenant or the hired hand meets his part of the bargain. 
The landlord's transaction costs are highest for labor contracts, for 
in addition to keeping the laborer from misusing the property, the 
landlord has to supervise him to make sure he furnishes the amount of 
labor specified in the contract. With perfect information and no 
uncertainty, a landlord could observe the hired hand's effort directly 
or infer it from agricultural output. But in the real world, he has to 
pay to discover how hard the laborer works, and he has to monitor him 
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in order to prevent shirking. The transaction costs are somewhat lower 
for sharecropping, because the cropper has some incentive to work; 
however, the landlord must still supervise the cropper to a certain 
extent, because the cropper receives only a fraction of his marginal 
product and hence has reason to undersupply labor. Transactions costs 
are lowest of all for fixed rental contracts, for the renter receives 
his full marginal product and therefore has no reason to shirk. The 
landlord need only insure that the tenant does not ruin the property.12 
What keeps landlords from offering nothing but fixed rental 
contracts with their low transaction costs is the premium (in the form 
of reduced rent, for example) which they must offer risk averse 
tenants in order to induce them to accept the uncertainties of paying 
a fixed rent. The premium is lower for share contracts because 
croppers absorb only a fraction of the risk. And since there is 
little or no risk attached to a fixed wage payment, the landlord need 
offer no premium in order to engage farm hands. The mix of contracts 
is then determined by the balance between transaction costs and risk 
premiums. 
If transaction costs increase (other things being equal) then 
we would expect landlords to shift from wage contracts toward 
sharecropping and renting. Rental contracts would also become 
preferable to share agreements. In each case, more landlords would 
prefer to pay risk premiums to tenants rather than to face the higher 
transaction costs, and the resultant change in the supply of contracts 
would shift the contractual mix. And of course the reverse would be 
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true if transaction costs dropped. 
One virtue of this theory is that it clearly fits the 
qualitative evidence from early modern France. De Serres and other 
contemporaries noticed that renters demanded a premium in the form of 
lower rent for the risks they faced, and de Serres suggested that the 
premium and risks were reduced for sharecroppers. De Serres and the 
contracts themselves also make it clear that landlords had to do more 
and more monitoring as they moved from renting toward sharecropping and 
wage labor. Indeed, rental contracts invariably contained fewer 
stipulations than either share or wage labor contracts. 
Furthermore, the theory actually yields a hypothesis applicable 
to early modern quantitative data: if transaction costs rise, a given 
landlord will be more likely to prefer rental contracts to 
sharecropping, and sharecropping to wage labor, all other things being 
equal. We can then test this hypothesis with the Lyonnais contracts 
which we used to examine Bloch's ideas. The transaction costs 
themselves are unobservable, but the contracts do furnish us with two 
useful proxies for the costs of supervising a farm and of monitoring 
labor. The first is the distance between the landlord's residence and 
the location of his property. De Serres and other contemporaries noted 
that distant property was more expensive to administer, and for this 
reason de Serres all but ruled out wage labor for most absentee 
landlords.13 Obviously, transaction costs would rise higher the 
farther away the property. 
The second proxy affecting transaction costs is the presence or 
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absence of vineyards. Vines were a capital investment requiring 
considerable supervision whatever the contract--recall, for example, 
de Serres's warning against tenants who cut them too short. Once the 
landlord took steps to inspect the vines, though, the marginal cost of 
monitoring his sharecropper's or his hired hand's labor was reduced. 
On farms with vines, then, we would expect lower costs for monitoring 
labor, more sharecropping relative to renting, and more wage labor 
relative to any form of tenancy.14 
The evidence from the sample of Lyonnais contracts supports 
both these contentions. In the tiny region from which these contracts 
were drawn, risks probably did not vary greatly; 
hence we can in effect hold constant the other major factor--risk 
conditions--which affected the contractual mix.15 Transaction costs 
should then explain the variations in contract type, and if we apply 
logit analysis, we find that our proxies for the transaction costs do 
indeed have the expected effect on contract choice (Table 2). The 
positive sign of the distance variable coefficients implies that 
landlords were more likely to lease distant property to renters and 
sharecroppers than to hire wage labor. Distant estates were also more 
likely to be leased for a fixed rent than sharecropped. Similarly, the 
negative coefficients for vines suggest that vineyard owners were more 
likely (other things being equal) to hire laborers than to engage 
tenants. They also found sharecropping preferable to renting, as 
expected. Furthermore, not only did all of these coefficients have the 
proper signs, but nearly all of them passed the appropriate one-tailed 
TABLE 2 
LOGIT ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT CHOICE 
VARIABLE 
Constant 
VINE (1 for Property 
with Vineyards, 
0 Otherwise) 
T-STATISTIC 
DISTANCE (= Kilometers 
from Landlord's Home 
to Property) 
T-STATISTIC 
N 
Log-likelihood ratios 
Source: See Table 1 
COEFFICIENT 
FOR EFFECT ON 
RENTING RELATIVE 
TO WAGE LABOR 
1.932 
- 4.45 
- 3.15 
0.076 
2.07 
83 cases 
58.47 (6 df) 
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COEFFICIENT FOR 
EFFECT ON SHARE-
CROPPING RELATIVE 
TO WAGE LABOR 
1.869 
-3.25 
-2.38 
0.060 
1.65 
Note: The logit analysis seeks to explain the choice of rental, share, 
or labor contracts by means of the two independent variables: VINE and 
DISTANCE. As in the simple case of binomial logit, we assume that 
choice of contract is dictated by unobserved latent variables which are 
linear functions of VINE and DISTANCE. If P1, P2 and P3 are the 
probabilities, respectively, of rental share labor contracts, then it 
turns out that 
pl 
ln ~ = a0 + a1 VINE + a2 DISTANCE, 
2 
where ao, al and a2 are the coefficients estimated in the 
above. Similarly, 
p2 
ln ~ = bo + bl VINE + b2 DISTANCE, 
3 
left column 
where the bi are estimated in the right column above. Again, we can 
interpret the coefficients much as we do in regression: the positive 
coefficient of DISTANCE in the right column implies that the greater 
the distance, the more common sharecropping is relative to wage labor. 
Note that we can also estimate the relative odds of rental versus 
sharecropping; it follows from the relationships and estimates above 
that 
pl 
ln ~ = 0.06 - 1.20 VINE + 0.016 DISTANCE. 
2 (1.94) (1.58) 
Here T-statistics are in parentheses. Note that vines make 
sharecropping preferable to renting, and distance does the reverse. 
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tests of significance at better than the five percent level. 16 
Obviously, a number of criticisms could be raised against this 
evidence. First, one could argue that instead of using the presence of 
vines as a proxy for lower labor monitoring costs we should have 
included any landlord contribution of capital. Any capital good or 
equipment, from vines and oxen to hand tools, would cut the marginal 
cost of supervising labor. This is certainly a reasonable argument, 
and the only justification for singling out vines is that they were 
mentioned by de Serres and that they represented the landlords' major 
capital contribution to local farming. They also undoubtedly required 
more supervision than other capital goods. In any event, substituting 
the presence of any landlord capital does not change the logit 
analysis significantly. All the coefficients still have the proper 
sign, and most are still significant.17 
A second concern might be a number of additional variables that 
perhaps should be included in the analysis. Higher urban wages, for 
example, could conceivably make agricultural labor contracts harder to 
enforce, because a hired hand might abandon the plow to work in town. 
But if we insert a real wage index for urban workers into the logit 
analysis, it fails the significance test, no doubt because the labor 
market was strong enough to provide a replacement for any farm worker 
who quit his post.18 A more troubling omission is the lack of any 
measure for the amount of land being farmed. A large farm might well 
involve increased labor supervision costs, and thus farm size might 
affect the choice of a contract. Unfortunately, the agricultural 
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contracts from this period do not usually report the size of the plots 
in question, so no perfectly reliable land measure is available. But 
we can take refuge behind the fact that in those contracts which do 
mention land size the farms are relatively homogeneous. Moreover, we 
can use the number of plots mentioned in each contract as a crude 
measure of farm size; when added to the logit analysis, the number of 
plots fails significance tests and does not disturb the other 
coefficients. 19 
Finally, one might criticize the assumption that risk 
conditions remained constant. While agricultural risks might not have 
varied greatly over the tiny region from which the sample was selected, 
they could have changed over the period the contracts covered (the 
years 1563-1633), and the fluctuations in risk might have affected the 
contract mix. One way to test this would be to employ the variations 
in local lease rates as an approximate measure of risk. When inserted 
into the logit analysis, though, this risk proxy proves insignificant, 
and it hardly affects the other logit coefficients.20 
Evidently, risk conditions did not vary enough to shift contract 
choices. 
To be sure, a sample of 83 cases may seem like very little 
evidence to hinge a theory upon, but the t-statistics bely the 
insinuation that our results are the work of chance. More evid.ence 
and more analysis are certainly in order before we can be certain (one 
would like to know, for example, what risks peasants faced as 
consumers, what other forms of insurance were available to them, and 
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what bigger landlords did), but at the very least, the theory of 
agricultural contracts gives us an attractive candidate for future 
research.21 And as we have seen, the theory has the added virtue of 
explaining the qualitative evidence, drawn from de Serres and other 
sources in several regions of early modern France. 
The theory also provides a ready explanation for the spread of 
sharecropping. Sharecropping, we saw, grew more prevalent at precisely 
the same time that French peasants were losing their land to absentee 
landlords. These absentee owners had to contend with costs of 
administering distant, newly purchased properties, and from what we 
know of the theory of contracts, it was only natural that they resorted 
to sharecropping (and to renting) instead of to hiring laborers.22 The 
increase in sharecropping (relative to wage labor) was thus a result of 
the transfer of peasant property into the hands of absentee landlords, 
and this transfer itself appears to have been caused by monarchy's 
fiscal system, for the monarchy was granting increasingly valuable tax 
exemptions to precisely the sort of privileged person who bought up the 
peasant land. These nobles, officers, and city dwellers paid little or 
nothing in the way of taxes on the peasant land they purchased, and 
they bought up land from tax-paying peasant proprietors until the costs 
of administering distant property putweighed the value of their tax 
exemptions.23 As absentee owners, they simply found sharecropping 
preferable to wage labor. 
It is clear as well why sharecropping was so often associated 
with poverty: it was, quite simply, a way of administering property in 
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areas where overburdened peasants had lost their farms to absentee 
owners, a contract undertaken with tenants who possessed little or no 
land or capital. But if sharecropping was associated with rural 
poverty, it is wrong to blame it for France's agricultural stagnation. 
The frequent claim that sharecropping meant disengagement from the 
market collapses once we realize that highly commercial crops were 
often raised by croppers: not just wine in the Lyonnais, but also 
mulberry trees for the silk trade farther south. Indeed, share 
landlords were frequently involved in the sale, rather than in the 
consumption, of the produce from these estates.24 Nor does it seem 
proper to argue that the draconian clauses in sharecropping leases 
stifled agricultural change. These clauses, we have seen, were merely 
rational attempts to protect property rights and monitor labor. They 
were supple enough to change from place to place and over time, and 
regular labor contracts contained even more rigid clauses.25 Indeed 
economic theory suggests that sharecropping was merely a way of dealing 
with risk, incentives, and transaction costs. It was thus not an 
obstacle to economic growth, and the true causes of agriculture 
stagnation in France have to be sought elsewhere--perhaps in the tax 
system that treated peasants so unfairly. 
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